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Abstract: In his famous book Sources of Christian Eth-
ics, fr. Servais Theodore Pinckaers OP described the pro-
cess of transformation that our understanding of the ethi-
cally right and wrong has undergone for the last two thou-
sand years. Much of his attention the scientist gave to the 
problem of human freedom, on the decision of which 
largely depend the moral principles of a society. In par-
ticular, he clarified and analyzed the transition from the 
concept of freedom advocated by Thomas Aquinas to the 
William Ockham’s concept of freedom. In this article, I 
will not only present this transformation, but also point 
out those of its consequences in European thinking, which 
we still observe in our societies. 
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1. Freedom in the understanding of Thomas Aquinas 
 
The problem of free will became one of the important 
topics in medieval Christian philosophy, primarily due to 
the comprehension of the interaction between the absolute 
will of God and the moral choice of man. In this article, I 
will mainly refer to the solution proposed by Thomas 
Aquinas, but before him about freedom not only Augus-
tine Aurelius wrote, but also such apologists as Justin 
Martyr and Clement of Alexandria, such Church Fathers 
as Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa. In turn, medi-
eval solution, early as well as high, is based on the ancient 
philosophy, for example, Aristotle and the Stoics, and, of 
course, on Holy Scripture. 
Freedom, according to Aquinas, is an ability proceed-
ing from the intellect and the will (“liberum arbitrium 
dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis1, which, in turn, 
are the inclinations to truth and good. The first dimension 
of free choice (the order of entity and specification) de-
pends on the intellect: on the object of knowledge, as well 
as on the analysis of alternatives. Initially, the direction of 
judgment is determined by some intuitive comprehension, 
the ability to choose between good and evil in favor of the 
first (principle: bonum est faciendum, malum est vitan-
dum), namely by synderesis. The second dimension of 
free choice comes from the subject (the choice between 
action and inaction). Judgments of the intellect, practical 
judgments, give to the choice a conscious motivation, 
however this choice is actualized by will, by effort of the 
person who strives for the good by means of the action, 
and thus it becomes free.  It is worth noting that the origi-
nal movement of the will, according to Thomas, like the 
intuitive knowledge of the first principles, is a sponta-
neous volition of such goals as good and happiness. The 
difficult task of freedom consists in choosing the means to 
achieve these goals, i.e. it is represented as a function of 
the will.2    
As we see, according to Aquinas, will and intellect 
follow natural inclinations to good, truth, happiness, 
that’s why he considers these inclinations as sources of 
freedom, and not as restrictions for its manifestation. 
Spontaneity, from which the freedom proceeds, is inher-
ent in all people by nature; it ensures the achievement of 
happiness as a natural goal. In the realm of morality, this 
spontaneity is manifested in the sense of truth, good, right 
and love; i.e. they also do not limit, but reveal the free-
dom: “We are free, not in spite of them, but because of 
them. The more we develop them, the more we grow in 
freedom”.3  
Therefore, it is possible to evaluate the so-understood 
freedom only on the basis of the attractiveness of the ob-
ject: it spontaneously manifests itself with respect to the 
things marked by good or truth. The subject can be mis-
taken and even deliberately strive for a false good – this is 
the weakness of freedom or rather of the being endowed 
with freedom. That’s why a person should cleans his or 
her inclinations of external layers. The naturalness of 
striving for happiness means that counteraction to this de-
sire cannot be called free.  
On the other hand, the fact that we cannot choose the 
ultimate goal, but only the means to achieve it, also does 
not mean a limitation of freedom. According to the logic 
of Thomas Aquinas, the very our ability to unlimited truth 
and good is unlimited. Looking forward them (or loving 
God), we do not experience pressure, because this gravity, 
and consequently, the will motivated by it is natural for 
us. Thanks to our spiritual abilities, our unlimited free-
dom, our will becomes free also in relation to all final and 
individual goods, means on the way to the goal. 
The virtues help us to advance in the way to the final 
goal, to adapt to the true good by developing of our per-
fect natural abilities. Virtues, according to Aquinas, are 
the perfections of strength, of dynamics in a person (“vir-
tus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat perfectionem poten-
tiae”4). We can say that virtue is a property of character, 
or a permanent predisposition to actions that are agreed 
with the good. Virtue is directly connected with the act of 
making a decision, with a choice: we manifest virtues 
when perpetrate acts of will, but also our acts of will, our 
choices are conditioned by character traits. This is the 
case with all habitus –  predispositions that govern desires 
and behavior in general (virtues are the most perfect of 
them), abilities to act and develop his- or herself (with 
regard to Tomas, habitus should not be confused with 
habits as psychological mechanisms). At first glance, such 
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a system of habitus and virtues should limit freedom, 
prompting certain decisions to be made. However, in the 
views of Aquinas, habitus and, especially, virtues, in the 
case of their development, on the contrary, allow freedom 
to unfold, as they promote progress towards the ultimate 
goal, i.e. toward happiness. 
As I have already noted, virtues can be and must be 
developed, and the path of such improvement coincides 
with the way of strengthening the will, the intellect and, 
as a result, the educating of freedom. Surprisingly, this 
education begins from discipline – not as a violent direc-
tion of the will, but as an appeal to natural inclinations, 
spontaneous sense of the good, to a conscience. The task 
is not to inculcate behavioral habits that restrict freedom, 
but, on the contrary, to discover the opportunity that it 
has: the desire of unlimited truth and unlimited good. 
At the second stage of that formation, a disciplined 
person takes his or her life – first of all, moral one – in 
own hands and, so to say, develops the taste for values. 
Instead of the limitations that characterize discipline, the 
person is motivated by the desire for progress of his or her 
own virtue for its own sake. 
At the third stage of the freedom’s formation Thomas 
sees not only moral maturity, but also fruitfulness, as well 
as the responsibility of a person:  
 
Due to the gradual development of his faculties, the human per-
son is now capable of viewing his life in its entirety. He per-
forms his actions personally according to a plan, a higher goal 
which will profit himself and others. This leads him, through 
patient acceptance of all trials and obstacles, to the fulfillment of 
a lift project which gives meaning, value and fruitfulness to ex-
istence.5 
 
As we will see later, in this definition of Pinckaers there 
is something from Sartre's attitude, however, he expresses 
the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The similarity is natural, 
since it is a question of one subject – freedom. On the 
other hand, the point of view of Aquinas cannot be esti-
mated worthily without specifying that the formation of 
freedom should include not only development and har-
monization of one's personality, but also an openness to 
another person. Agape love is the perfection of such an 
openness.  
Thus, from the point of view of Thomas Aquinas, 
freedom is a possibility of development coordinated with 
human rationality. However, the medieval theologian 
does not exclude the ability to resist the prompts of intel-
lect, also calling it freedom. Contrary to teleology, there 
is also the possibility not to strive for happiness. So, 
Aquinas overcomes the threat of determinism on the part 
of rationality; however, he believes such a decision is not 
the maximum manifestation of the freedom, but, on the 
contrary, a sign of its weakness (something like childish 
whim).6  
In conclusion, I should note that, Aquinas adopts the 
Aristotelian definition, according to which a man is free, 
because he is the goal for himself, and does not exist for 
something else. However, unlike Aristotle, who con-
sidered some people to be slaves by nature, Thomas 
Aquinas asserted the radical and universal equality of all 
people. This remark allows us to assert that “freedom by 
nature” is considered by Thomas as “one of the refine-
ments of existence in a particularly excellent way: exist-
ence not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself”7, 
which inherent in a person.  
 
 
2. William Ockham’s revolution 
 
British Franciscan William Ockham was almost a con-
temporary of Thomas Aquinas. However, his attitude to 
freedom and morality in whole is fundamentally different. 
He asserts that freedom is a power to cause, indifferently 
and accidently, different effects, in such a way that a per-
son can bring about an effect or don’t do it. Freedom is 
postulated by Ockham as the ability to choose between 
opposites; he reduces it to indifference in relation to those 
values that could determine this choice. The indifference 
to the objects of choice allows the will to proceed when it 
makes a decision solely from itself.  
Such conclusions Ockham reached analyzing the na-
ture of God. For Ockham, the will of God is so free that it 
opposes determination even by His goodness. Good, ac-
cording to Occam, is what God desires, but not contrary. 
The same can be said about the moral order in the created 
world: he divine will at any time can change its own pre-
cepts, even the first commandment. Thus, the original 
freedom inherent in God is indifferent to the objects of 
choice. Freedom becomes the main property of God; He 
becomes the freedom himself.  
Since there cannot be two definitions of freedom in 
one system, Ockham gives a person the same independ-
ence from his own nature as God. However, God also is 
omnipotent, He can impose His will on man: this is the 
only difference between divine and human freedom. Ac-
cordingly, the relationship between God and man can rest 
only on the “right of the strong” (first of all, of God); the 
strong enforces the low, and the weak has the obligation 
to fulfill it. Taking into account the fact that, according to 
Ockham, God is free to change any of His precepts, we 
see here the way to moral relativism: morality rests on 
obligation versus law regardless of its content.  
Freedom as the “right of the strong” to impose his law 
on the basis of non-determinism by external objects and 
internal characteristics also means that it turns out to be 
the primary force in relation to reason and will. It is a 
matter of free choice – to learn or not to learn, to desire or 
not to desire. In relation to the reason, this means that the 
will can resist to its decisions. Thus, in spite of the fact 
that freedom is declared to be the primary fact of experi-
ence, practically it is identified with the will, it becomes 
the source and conductor of human actions. The will re-
ceives a new interpretation. 
 
It was no longer defined as an attraction toward the good, exer-
cised in love and desire, as in St. Thomas and the Fathers. It be-
came a radical indifference, whence proceeded a pure will, actu-
ally ab imposition of will on itself or others, ‘a conscious pres-
sure of self upon self’, to use E. Mounier’s definition. This was 
to become the modern understanding of will.8 
 
But most acutely Ockham opposed freedom to the natural 
inclinations of human – to good, truth and happiness. 
Similarly, sensuality and, in particular, passions become 
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threats, obstacles to freedom, not only: the will strength-
ens itself in opposing them (the rigorism in morality). As 
a motivation, alien to the will, Ockham considers also a 
virtue. 
Since the inclinations are in subjection to freedom, the 
desire for happiness ceases to be the determining factor 
for the human. A person is free to choose happiness, un-
happiness as well as his or her nonexistence. Hence the 
negation of the finality, i.e. the existence of the ultimate 
goal, which is happiness.9 
The negation of the finality is directly related to Ock-
ham's nominalism. If, according to Thomas Aquinas, 
ultimate goal is a principle of the unity of all particular 
person’s actions, then Ockham’s absolute indeterminacy 
of the individual actions breaks the foundation of such 
unity. An independent action takes place after an instant 
unrelated decision. Therefore, Ockham considers the goal 
only as a single, isolated one of a concrete action.  
A person whose dignity is the ability to do at any 
moment what he or she wants becomes elusive – result of 
collecting a “puzzle” from various, inconsistent acts.10 
This disappearance of the person behind a variety of ac-
tions did not signify, however, its destruction, but the 
concentration on him- or herself in the name of the most 
important willing – the assertion of the freedom. Indiffer-
ence of the will in relation to inclinations and prompts of 
reason does not mean apathy, but, on the contrary, implies 
a kind of passion: “the human will to self-affirmation, to 
the assertion of a radical difference between itself and all 
also that existed”11. This requirement to provide a person, 
rests solely on his or her selfness, the ability to choose 
between opposites, we now, after Kant, call autonomy. 
We understand it as independence from the law, norms 
and everything that does not come from the self, as an 
opportunity to refuse, to contradict, to accuse and gener-
ally to be against something, and also to enjoy the pleas-
ure in arbitrariness of our actions. 
 
 
3. Development of the concepts of freedom and au-
tonomy after Ockham's “revolution” 
 
At the time when the philosophy of the Middle Ages was 
transformed into a Modern one, Ockham's understanding 
of freedom was firmly entrenched in European thinking. 
Descartes, for instance, argues that the will by nature is so 
free that it can never be constrained, limited. Contempo-
rary of Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, being a materialist 
and emphasizing the egoistic character of human nature, 
pays much attention to the motives of person’s activity. 
He already doesn’t understand why Thomas Aquinas has 
placed inclinations and reason in the foundation of free-
dom. Therefore, although natural law, according to Hob-
bes, is a freedom (liberty) to do anything against anyone, 
referring to own interest (to own goal), this freedom is 
limited by the natural law in the form of reason’s direc-
tion. At the same time, the inborn desire, the will to claim 
the benefit for oneself, is in such a disunity with this natu-
ral law that the latter can only be guaranteed by the dic-
tates of the state. It is the basing of freedom as an unlim-
ited choice between alternatives that prevents Hobbes 
from asserting the existence of real freedom – permis-
siveness – in civil society: according to its nature, such a 
society deprives the individual to carry freely certain ac-
tions in favor of preserving the harmony of interests.12 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also thinks in the same way: 
man is born free, i.e. unlimited in his choice of actions. 
Naturally, liberty is “bounded only by the strength of the 
individual”13. Liberation, therefore, consists in overcom-
ing the restrictions (imposed by other people) and gaining 
the benefit of one's own strength without meeting resist-
ance. However, this freedom from limitations is combined 
in Rousseau's theory with positive freedom: it is into it 
that the social contract transforms the permissiveness. 
When concluding the contract, people put all their 
strength under control of the common will; now they 
make decisions not individually, but together. Such civil 
liberty implies the right to preserve property and enjoy the 
rights of a citizen (first of all, the right to take part in col-
lective decision-making), as well as moral freedom.   
Pointing to this transformation of the liberty, Rous-
seau, however, realizes that in fact it is its limitation and 
even destruction. A natural human being who cares only 
about natural liberty does not have a sufficient basis to be 
tempted by the delights of civil liberty and moral free-
dom. The social contract, thus, annuls freedom, but only 
because Rousseau thinks of it in the terms of Ockham, as 
an unconditional arbitrariness. 
In the current discussion, we cannot ignore David 
Hume’s attitude. Only Ockham’s conception makes him 
regard freedom of will as a fiction. According to the Brit-
ish empiricist, human actions are led by passions by an-
alogy with the attraction and repulsion forces in the 
theory of Newton. According to Hume, a passion is “a 
violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or 
evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original 
formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite”14. 
In other words, the motive power of each action is desire; 
i.e. every action always has its a reason (on the principle 
of association in our minds). If person's actions have a 
rigid connection with motives or personal characteristics, 
then they are so caused as the movements of material ob-
jects. Identifying freedom with chance, Hume does not 
find it in human consciousness, that’s why he declares it 
to be the same fiction as the independent existence of self.    
Immanuel Kant also shares this point of view, but only 
when writes about the world of phenomena. This world, 
which includes, among other things, the actions and men-
tal states of a person (e.g., empirical character), every-
thing that constitutes experience, that is organized by the 
forms of space and time and by the categories. We can 
find a reason to every action of a person, it can be de-
duced from the phenomena of a natural order. Kant 
clearly states that there is no freedom with respect to this 
empirical character. However, it is in the world of nou-
mena, lying beyond the forms of time and space and the 
category of causality. The best proof of this is the exist-
ence of morality which is impossible without freedom. 
Such, noumenal, freedom is thought by Kant, first of 
all, as an independence from the laws of nature, but, in 
turn, as an obedience to those laws that a man “makes 
himself and in virtue of which his maxims can have their 
part in the making of universal law (to which he at the 
same time subjects himself)”15. Such freedom cannot be 
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either learned or understood from any experience, it holds 
only as “a necessary presupposition of reason in a being 
who believes himself to be conscious of a will – that is, of 
a power distinct from mere appetition”16.  The will is 
aware of its ability to initiate a chain of causes by the 
power of reason, i.e. freely; and therefore it is a creator of 
those laws to which it obeys.  
According to Kant, will is a kind of causality of intel-
ligent beings, and freedom is its property, which allows to 
action independently of extraneous reasons. Freedom, 
then, turns out to be independence, first of all, from exter-
nal world which affects the will, that is from sensual in-
clinations, pleasure, pain and the pursuit of happiness, of 
any empirical interest, as well as from all other inclina-
tions that do not proceed from the will. Kant, of course, 
does not forbid a person to wish happiness, as well as take 
care of his or her health. However, it is not these aspira-
tions, but obligation, that must be taken into account 
when someone choose an action. We see here that Kant 
accepts the nominalistic concept of free will. 
According to Kant, freedom should be postulated, first 
of all, because otherwise it is impossible to imagine the 
action of practical reason, which establishes norms and 
rules of human behavior. Only being independent of any 
external factor in relation to it, the reason “exercises cau-
sality in regard to its objects”17. Otherwise the subject 
would attribute the determination of his power of judge-
ment to an external to his will impulsion. This is unac-
ceptable, since only one impulsion attaches moral value to 
an action, namely, respect for the law which the will itself 
lays down.  
Thus, Kant postulates autonomy as a property of will, 
through which it is a law to itself, independently of the 
objects for which it wishes, i.e. self-sufficiency of the 
will. If the will seeks the law that is to determine it in the 
characters of objects, it is heteronomy. In that case the 
object gives the low to the will, and it acts according to 
the laws of nature.18 
I should note, however, that autonomy, in the form in 
which Kant postulates it, does not mean the justification 
for any human actions. It is the first imperative that limits 
it: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law”19. 
Autonomy is predetermined by the universal nature of the 
reason, not by certain needs that are the consequences of 
freely chosen actions. Any action that does not proceed 
from my reason cannot be truly mine, it is heteronomous. 
In turn, any action that proceeds from my reason must 
meet its requirements: I must act only according to the 
principle that I would like to see as the basis for such ac-
tions of all people. This demand of reason, expressed as a 
categorical imperative, is a formal law (it cannot be for-
mulated in terms of consequences, and it recognizes only 
one motive – action according to it). Freedom can be pos-
tulated only in relation to this demand:  
 
This amounts to freedom, because acting morally is acting ac-
cording to what we truly are, moral/rational agents. The law of 
morality, in other words, is not imposed from outside. It is dic-
tated by the very nature of reason itself. To be a rational agent is 
to act for reasons. By their very nature, reasons are of general 
application. […] 
So if the decision to act morally is the decision to act with the 
ultimate purpose of conforming my action to universal law, then 
this amounts to the determination to act according to my true 
nature as a rational being. And acting according to the demands 
of what I truly am, of my reason, is freedom.20       
 
Morality, therefore, is identified by Kant with the univer-
sal demand of reason, to listen to which we are con-
strained by obligation. The latter is the need for an action 
dictated by respect for this demand as a law. It is obliga-
tion that frees a person from subordinating empirical ne-
cessity. Fulfilling the obligation, a person becomes both 
moral and free at the same time. 
It is worth mentioning that Kant's ideas, like also 
Locke’s, formed the basis of the phenomenon that we call 
Western liberalism. In terms of politics liberalism is the 
doctrine according to which the right and freedom of the 
individual have a priority in relation to the intervention of 
the state in the life of citizens. The main reason for this 
attitude of the state is the idea of a person as a rational 
being, capable to learn the truths on one’s own, to identify 
one's will in accordance with that truths, and therefore to 
direct it to creation and not to destruction, as well as to 
respect the similar actions of another person. Such a per-
son knows what his or her interest is, and intelligently 
realizes it in a healthy competition with others, finding a 
compromise that does not disparage the dignity of any of 
the parties. Finally, the whole society embodied in the 
state cannot consider the person as a means for even the 
highest goals, and therefore violate his or her rights, treat 
the person as heteronomous in relation to that society. 
However, at the origins of liberalism one more ethical 
direction, the opposite of Kant's deontology, lies, namely, 
utilitarianism. Proceeding from the understanding of the 
good as an individual’s benefit, and the common good as 
a collection of interests of members of society, Jeremy 
Bentham protects the ideas of liberalism in his own way. 
The state's non-interference in private life, especially the 
economic one, is necessary, in his opinion, in order that 
nothing prevents the individual from maximizing pleasure 
and minimizing suffering.  
John Stuart Mill writes about freedom in his work On 
Liberty.21 He argues there that self-determination and the 
possibility of choice are the components of the concept of 
happiness. Any restrictions imposed by the state, in this 
case, should be justified only by mitigating harm to other 
members of society. Restrictions of freedom, therefore, 
are permissible only to ensure safety of its manifestations. 
Speaking about freedom, about its modern under-
standing, we cannot help mentioning the influential con-
cept of Jean-Paul Sartre. Without going into the details of 
his paradoxical definition of freedom as such that has no 
essence, I will only reveal those moments that show us 
that Sartre’s understanding inherits the tradition that Ock-
ham laid. Thus I will consider the freedom with respect to 
the motives and end of the action or choice.  
It is important to note that the topic of freedom in Be-
ing and Nothingness Sartre especially examines in con-
nection with the study of human actions in the world or 
the realizing of personal project. Such an action always 
proceeds from a desire as recognizing a certain lack in 
oneself, and therefore it is intentional, i.e. it has an end. In 
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turn, the end refers to a cause or a motive. Thus, deter-
minism seems to be justified, however, Sartre dodges 
from it, arguing that it is action that makes a decision 
about causes and ends, and action is an expression of 
freedom. After all, to be free means to determine oneself 
independently to wanting or choosing: to choosing ends 
and acting for their achievement.   
First of all, Sartre points to the stupidity of disputes 
between determinists and proponents of freedom as indif-
ferent, unmotivated choice. That proponents, being the 
followers of Ockham, “are concerned to find cases of de-
cision for which there exists no prior cause, or deliber-
ations concerning two opposed actions which are equally 
possible and possess causes (and motives) of exactly the 
same weight”22. At first glance, the determinists seem to 
be more sensible, because the action, in order to be a hu-
man one, and not a physical event, must have motivation 
and end. However, here Sartre puts the question of the 
very end and the very cause.  
Sartre's analysis shows that the end is something non-
existent. A human actions to fill a certain lack, emptiness, 
in him- or herself. Similarly, the matter is with the cause. 
It appears only then when a person, being-for-itself, at-
taches to it the significance of the motive, and it happens 
not because of referring to some previous being, but be-
cause of intentional involvement in nothingness. Thus, 
not the independent from the being-for-itself cause creates 
the motive for the action, but the totality of his or her pro-
jects (e.g., not suffering, but a decision to change the 
situation in which a person suffers). Such a motive is an 
integral part of an action that turns out to be free. The ac-
tion itself makes a decision about the ends and causes. 
Only through actions can we get an answer to the ques-
tion: what we are; and even the feelings we are refer to 
justify the choice, in fact, are the product of an action. 
When we evaluate our behavior, only its consequences 
are important, because per se there are no causes. But 
there are not the ends also, because the action proceeds 
from nothingness. Thus, a person is free even when faces 
with obstacles in the pursuit of aspirations, for the main 
thing in freedom is not achievements, but the desire itself, 
proceeding from negativity.  
Speaking of the cause, Sartre agrees that it becomes 
the basis for the action only as a totality of rational con-
siderations that justify it, or as an objective evaluation of 
the situation. In other words, freedom requires reflection. 
Through reflection, a person discovers that he or she is a 
nothingness for him- or herself, and affirms the freedom 
from everything external, including the cause. Sartre 
writes: “To adopt Husserl’s famous expression, simple 
voluntary reflection by its structure as reflectivity prac-
tices the έποχή with regard to the cause; it holds the 
cause in suspense, puts it within parentheses”23. Thus ra-
tionality, in spite of the fact that it is necessary for free-
dom, is nevertheless secondary to it, because proceeds 
from it as a negation of the reality which exists outside 
the person (freedom from), in contrast to which the per-
son becomes a being-for-itself.  
The same can be said about the will, which is a 
négatité and a force of nihilation.  It does not create the 
end that freedom seeks, but is an instrument for achieving 
it: “Freedom is nothing but the existence of our will or of 
our passions in so far as this existence is the nihilation of 
facticity; that is, the existence of a being which is its be-
ing in the mode of having to be it”24. 
The fact that freedom precedes both will and con-
sciousness does not, however, means the chronological 
precedence. Freedom exists in the very action, in the very 
choice. Hence it follows that the choice cannot be non-
free, i.e. it has not conditions, and the motive of the action 
is in the action itself. Like Ockham, Sartre comes to the 
absolutism of freedom. In other words,  
 
by the sole fact that I am conscious of the causes which inspire 
my action, these causes are already transcendent objects for my 
consciousness; they are outside. In vain shall I seek to catch 
hold of them; I escape them by my very existence. I am con-
demned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes 
and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free.25 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Traditional concept of freedom followed mainly Aristotle. 
It was developed by Christian philosophers of the Middle 
Ages, first of all, in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. He 
didn’t consider the teleology of person’s action and the 
conscious motivation for it as barriers for personal free-
dom. 
Ockham defined freedom as the ability to choose in-
differently between opposites. Thus he began the tradition 
not to call free such actions that proceed from the pursuit 
of happiness, from natural inclinations, personal convic-
tions. In other words, freedom, in his opinion, precedes 
the self and determines this self. Freedom becomes the 
defining property of a person. 
The influence of Ockham’s conception can be seen in 
such different thinkers as Descartes, Hobbes and Rous-
seau. The latter argues that freedom as arbitrariness of 
will is a natural state of human being. Even civil liberty 
and moral freedom, according to Rousseau, are limita-
tions.  
Following Ockham's definition, Hume declares free-
dom to be a fiction, and Kant agrees with him when it 
comes to the world of phenomena and the empirical char-
acter. Kant postulates the existence of the freedom in the 
world of noumena. Nevertheless, he still proclaims it in-
compatible not only with feelings, but also with any incli-
nations and aspirations that do not arise from the pure 
will.  
On the basis of Kant's concept of autonomy and utili-
tarian views, so-called Western liberalism was developed. 
But especially clear the absolutization of freedom appears 
in the philosophy of the XX-th century, primarily, in exi-
stentialism. According to Sartre, not motives and ends de-
termine the actions of the individual, but vice versa. He 
claims freedom to be the ability to choose these ends. A 
person assigns both the end and the motive to be what 
they are.   
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